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We present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model in which
a resource-rich government allocates its excess resource rents between a
resource stabilization fund and the facilitation of costly domestic fund-raising
activities of sovereign wealth funds (SWF), which holds a portfolio of
government-linked companies (GLCs). Despite being less productive efficient,
GLCs' operation benefits from scale economies tied to the resource sector: its
profitability is procyclical to commodity shocks. The model is estimated to
Malaysia using the Bayesian approach, with the results suggesting a business
cycle heavily influenced by resource shocks. Based on this, we solve numeri-
cally for a socially optimal combination of excess resource savings allocation.
We find the present allocation to be sub-optimal, regardless of the structural
shocks. This suggests that the Malaysian economy might have hit its absorptive
capacity constraint (i.e., a domestic economy saturated by GLCs).
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Over three decades of theoretical contributions have
advised on the fiscal management strategies of resource
rents, notably in resource-rich developing economies, ever
since the ‘Dutch disease’ phenomenon was formally mod-
elled by Corden and Neary (1982). Although sudden
resource windfall provides opportunities to promote
growth and development, economies have historically
shown a tendency to experience a decline in non-resource
tradable production, due to a sharp real exchange rate
appreciation and increased demand for nontradables.
Moreover, in recent years, macroeconomic policymakers
with multipronged objectives when managing resource
revenue (consumption smoothing, built-up of
precautionary savings, and ensuring domestic business
stability) have grown increasingly concerned of the volatil-
ity associated with global resource prices resulting in
greater domestic macroeconomic instability (van der
Ploeg, 2011). Broadly, the evolution of the theoretical
models, and associated policy prescriptions, can be defined
by two paradigms. Traditionally, the central tenet of
resource revenue management is heavily influenced by
the consumption-smoothing consideration of the Perma-
nent Income Hypothesis (PIH) (Collier, van der Ploeg,
Spence, & Venables, 2010; van der Ploeg, 2011). In sum,
the government ought to keep its expenditure to a sustain-
able level, implying that any resource windfall generated
should be kept independent from the financing of the
non-resource primary fiscal balance, with its entirety
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saved in a resource stabilization fund abroad to serve as a
precautionary buffer. More recent theoretical contribu-
tions, or ‘second generations’ models such as van den
Bremer and van der Ploeg (2013), Berg, Portillo, Yang,
and Zanna (2013), Araujo, Li, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and
Zanna (2016), Agénor (2016), questioned the appropriate-
ness of the PIH approach for developing economies. Due
to persistent infrastructure gaps, they argue that these
economies would benefit more from flexible fiscal
arrangements by having some resource rents invested
domestically, insofar as it is being met by policies reducing
these capacity constraints.1
To date, the consensus of the two generations of
Dutch Disease theoretical models appears to be to devise
fiscal management rules that balance the investments of
resource windfall domestically and in offshore assets.
Nevertheless, there is an obvious gap between the theo-
retical literature and actual policy practices observed in
the real world. Specifically, in current theoretical models,
the allocation of resource wealth to be invested domesti-
cally is almost always specified to take the form of infra-
structure capital investments. In practice, this is often not
the case. Resource wealth not saved abroad is usually
spent on – both directly and indirectly – capitalizing
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or in a modern context,
the facilitation of domestic fund-raising activities by stra-
tegic holding funds [herein, dubbed as the sovereign
wealth funds (SWFs)] that invest or hold equity stakes in
government-linked companies (GLCs). Unlike the tradi-
tionally inefficient bureaucratic leviathans of SOEs, these
GLCs coexist with private firms in supplying the domes-
tic market across a wide range of sectors, and in some
instances can have lower hurdle rates of returns due to
the strategic roles in driving industrial development or
serving as ‘fiscal stimulus vehicles’ (Chang, 2007; Wen &
Wu, 2019). This is known as ‘state capitalism’ industrial
policies, which include investments through GLCs in
areas that are resource-intensive and possess long-term
economies-of-scale potentials (Cherif & Hasanov, 2019;
Cherif, Hasanov, & Kammer, 2016).2 In spite of these fea-
tures in emerging economies, a macroeconomic model
with GLCs remains elusive.
We contribute to the literature by developing a
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
with the inclusion of GLCs (which is ‘owned’ by a repre-
sentative SWF) and a resource stabilization fund (hence-
forth, Resource Fund). Although all resource revenue is
initially transferred to the budget, in deciding on its
usage, the federal government inexplicably allocates this
resource wealth between Resource Fund abroad, spend-
ing on facilitating fund-raising activities of the SWF
(hence indirectly in relation to its portfolio GLCs' produc-
tion), and other government operating expenditure. In
our knowledge, this is the first study in the tradition of
the Dutch Disease literature that explicitly models the
presence of the GLCs, towards understanding how opti-
mal fiscal management of resource rents differs under
different business-cycle conditions. The model also intro-
duces a novel feature that is consistent with cross-country
observations that distinguish GLCs from private firms:
On average, SOEs' operations tend to have better linkages
to the natural resource sector and hence benefitting from
scale economies. Based on our calculation using the sam-
ple of 11,805 privately owned enterprises (POEs) and
220 SOEs surveyed across 113 economies in the World
Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) during the 2008–2018
period, the former has an average fuel cost (as percentage
of sales) of 0.413 whereas the latter has a lower average
fuel cost of 0.344.
In the model context, we also identify analytically a
threshold value of the spending on domestic facilitation of
the fund-raising activities of the SWF, above which a typi-
cal GLC would make non-zero profits. Despite its relatively
generalizable feature, to capitalize on the sufficiently long
history of a GLC-dominant economy (see Menon, 2014, for
a study of more descriptive nature on Malaysia's GLC sec-
tor), the model is estimated to Malaysia using the Bayesian
approach, with the roles of resource price and other struc-
tural shocks evaluated using variance decomposition and
impulse response analysis. Note that the calibration is
mainly for a stylized applied theoretical macroeconomic
purpose to yield generalizable findings with respect to the
theories on optimal fiscal management of resource wealth
in a developing economy. As such, it is not meant to be a
specific study on Malaysia, which has a large number of
government-linked strategic investment funds (usually
dubbed as GLICs) with vastly different capitalization struc-
ture and stakeholders. To preview, we find that, even with-
out having to ‘shoehorn’ a nontradable sector into the
model, many classic features associated with the ‘Dutch
disease’ are still generated in the impulse responses follow-
ing a commodity/resource price shock – an important
influence to the business cycle of the GLCs-dominated
economy.3,4 We analysed numerically for an optimal com-
bination of allocation to the external Resource Fund and
the facilitation of fund-raising activities of the SWF in the
context of the minimization of a social loss function, à la
Agénor (2016). Given these, our study is closest to
Agénor (2016), García-Cicco and Kawamura (2015), Ojeda-
Joya, Parra-Polanía, and Vargas (2016). Our stability crite-
rion is similar to the former, but the actual data-based
business-cycle evaluations used to guide the optimality
analysis is closer to the latter two, which are calibrated to
Chile and Colombia respectively.
For an assumed share of resource wealth saved in each
period, we find the optimal allocation between the
Resource Fund abroad and the domestic facilitation of
fund-raising activities of the SWF to critically depend on
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the nature of the dominant business-cycle shock of con-
cern. Specifically, if one were to believe that the Malaysian
business-cycle is mainly driven by resource price shocks, as
in our empirical results, then an optimal foreign-domestic
allocation is in the range of (0.11, 0.89) to (0.19,0.81) – in
line with the fundamental recommendation of ‘first-gener-
ations’ Dutch Disease models. However, if one preferred to
think that the economy is more affected by domestic pref-
erence shocks, then the optimal foreign-domestic allocation
is approximately (0.38,0.62). This socially optimal combina-
tion appears to be lower than the benchmark case, there-
fore suggesting that the Malaysian economy might have hit
its absorptive capacity constraint (i.e., a domestic economy
saturated by GLCs).
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Sec-
tion 2 presents the model. Section 3 defines the equilibri-
ums, followed by the derivation of the theoretical
condition for GLC profitability. Section 4 discusses the
calibration. The Bayesian-estimated results and optimal
analysis are presented in Section 5, followed by conclud-
ing remarks in Section 6.
2 | THE MODEL
The model considered is a discrete-time, small open-
economy model with infinitely lived individuals and rep-
resentative agents. Similar to Agénor, Alper, and Pereira
da Silva (2014, 2018), private individuals hold both
domestic and foreign bonds – rates of returns to invest-
ments made, be it into capital or bonds, are therefore
influenced by structural shocks affecting both domestic
and foreign interest rates. However, unlike them and
most DSGE contributions, we abbreviate from modelling
explicitly the banking system, so as to concentrate on the
macroeconomic impacts brought about by the GLCs. The
government in the economy extracts non-renewal
resources (in a non-Hotelling framework similar to Berg
et al., 2013; Agénor, 2016), and the resource revenue is
then transferred to the budget. In deciding on its usage,
the federal government inexplicably allocates this
resource wealth between Resource Fund abroad, spend-
ing on facilitating fund-raising activities of the SWF, and
other government operating expenditure. Given that we
interpret GLCs as modernized corporations that produce
imperfectly substitutable differentiated variety of goods
(similar to private firms, that is, the POEs), they are
therefore consistent with the diverse business nature of
GLCs in Malaysia (see Ramirez & Tan, 2004;
Nawawi, 2018 for a description of SOEs/GLCs in Malay-
sia), and can be interpreted as the portfolio companies of
the SWF. In addition to the original capitalization made
by the government and the dividends received from the
GLCs, the SWF finances its activities by issuing one-
period bonds to high-profile investors (assumed to be
external to the economy). To allow for the examination
of our main research question, this fund-raising activity
is assumed to be costly and depends on the federal gov-
ernment's spending to facilitate fund-raising; this serves
as our model's ‘counterpart’ to a measure of domestic
capacity constraint in conventional Dutch Disease
models. In the model, the key distinctions between GLCs
and POEs are (a) the rental rates they paid for capital
stock are different; (b) although initially higher, the fixed
cost of the GLCs can potentially benefit from a scale-
economies factor that depends on the government spend-
ing on facilitation of the fund-raising activities of its
‘parent’, the representative SWF.
2.1 | Households
There is a continuum of identical infinitely lived individ-
uals, indexed by i ∈ (0, 1), who derive utility from con-
sumption (Cit) and leisure. They solve the intertemporal
optimization problem by choosing sequences of final
good consumption, Cit+ s , labour hours supplied to both
categories of intermediate good (IG) firms, Li,POEt+ s and
Li,GLCt,s , a fund transferred to private capital good pro-
ducer, ζi,It+ s , the holding of domestic government bonds,
bit+ s+1 , and foreign bonds, B
i,F
t+ s+1 , for s = 0, 1, …, ∞, so














where β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, ς > 0 the (inverse)
intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption,
t the expectation operator conditional on the informa-
tion available at the beginning of period t, ηN>0, and AUt
denotes a mean-one preference shock common to all
individuals following a first-order autoregressive [AR(1)]
process, AUt = A
U
0
 1−ρU AUt−1 ρUexp εUt  , where AU0 > 0 ,
ρU∈ (0, 1) is the associated AR coefficient, and εUt is a
normally distributed stochastic shock with zero mean
and a constant variance (σ2U ).
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(foreign-currency) holdings of one-period, non-
contingent domestic (foreign) government bonds, iBt and
iF,Pt are the interest rates on domestic and foreign govern-
ment bonds, rPOEt and wt the economy-wide real wage, T
i
t









ψ ∈ (0, 1) are an individual's share of real profits received
from the IG-producing POEs and the private capital good
producer. The domestic households are the only holders
of domestic government bonds. The gross rate of return
on foreign bonds is







where iWt is the risk-free world interest rate and θ
F,P
t an
endogenous spread taken as given by households, defined




BFt , with θ
F
0 > 0:.
Each individual i maximizes Equation (1) with











Equation (2), taking prices, factor returns, premium, and
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t Et+1=Etð Þ− 1+ iBt
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2.2 | Resource production and prices
Following Berg et al. (2013) and Agénor (2016), the
resource revenue is non-renewable, but the production is










where ~O is the steady-state value of extraction, ρO∈ (0, 1)
is the associated AR coefficient (which depends on how
quickly the resources are depleted), and εOt a normally
distributed random shock to resource production with
zero mean and a constant variance (σ2O). This is a simpli-
fied exogenous specification that assumes costless dril-
ling, therefore abstracts from the intertemporal Hotelling
arbitrage considerations explored in studies such as
Mason and van't Veld (2013) and Anderson, Kellogg, and
Salant (2018). Given that optimal extraction path is a
peripheral topic to our main focus, the stream of resource
revenue in each period can be interpreted as net profits/
dividend stream that is taken as given – albeit subject to
random shocks. Nevertheless, as seen later, for our analy-
sis the identification of the variable is based on actual
real per capita GDP series: the extraction series in the
model context (measured in constant prices, per capita
gross value added) is determined residually from the
domestic output identity, hence to an extent,
‘endogenous’.
Given that the country is assumed to be not a major
world supplier of the non-renewable resource, the real
















is the steady-state price, ρPO∈ 0,1ð Þ is the associ-
ated AR coefficient, and εP
O
t a normally distributed ran-
dom shock with zero mean and a constant variance (σ2PO ).
Despite the simplified specification, the stochastic AR
specification of Equations (8) and (9), together with
Bayesian estimation using actual oil price data, allow us
to estimate the actual degree of persistence, as in Cherif
and Hasanov (2013).
2.3 | Domestic final good
There is a representative firm producing a final good, Yt,
using a basket of domestically produced differentiated
intermediate goods (IGs), YDt , and a basket of imported
IGs, YFt , as in:
Yt = ΛD YDt
  η−1ð Þ=η
+ 1−ΛDð Þ YFt
  η−1ð Þ=ηh iη= η−1ð Þ
, ð10Þ
where ΛD ∈ (0, 1) and η > 0 is the elasticity of substitu-
tion between the two baskets.





h i θ−1ð Þ=θ
dj

 θ= θ−1ð Þ
, ð11Þ
where θ > 0 is the elasticity of substitution among the
imported IGs, and YFjt is the quantity of type-j imported
intermediate good (IG), j∈ (0, 1).
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Profits maximization by the representative firm yields





Y it, i=D,F, ð12Þ
where PDjt (P
F
jt ) is the price of domestic (imported) IG j,
and PDt and P
F
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where Pt is the aggregate price index of final output,
given by




+ 1−ΛDð Þη PFt
 1−ηh i1= 1−ηð Þ
: ð14Þ
Further, the domestically produced intermediate vari-
eties along the continuum j ∈ (0, 1) are produced by two










h i ω−1ð Þ=ω
dj

 ω= ω−1ð Þ
,
ð15Þ
where ω > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the
domestic IGs, and ϕ ∈ 0, 1] is the steady-state share of
GLCs' production in aggregate domestic IGs.5
For the domestically produced IGs, profit maximiza-














where PGLCjt and P
POE
jt are the price of IG j, and the aggre-
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, ð17Þ






















Using Equation (16), and the representative firm's





















Following Agénor and Jia (2015), the assumptions of
no transportation cost and producer currency pricing are







where μF ∈ (0, 1) measures the degree of exchange rate
pass-through. Thus, the law of one price holds only in
the steady state.
Exports, YXt , depend on the domestic-currency price
of exports (which equals the exchange rate if the foreign-







and is therefore a positive function of the real
exchange rate.
Total output in the domestic economy, inclusive of






where YSt denotes the volume of final goods sold in the
domestic market.
2.4 | Domestic intermediate goods
The modelling of the GLCs as IG-producers coexisting
with the private firms is similar to Tabarraei, Ghiaie, and
Shahmoradi (2018), Wen and Wu (2019). Each domesti-
cally produced IG, Yijt , is sold in a monopolistically com-
petitive market. For simplicity, we abbreviate from entry
and exit considerations, and assume a fixed unit mass of
domestic firms operating in the market in each period t.
Each firm j is assumed to produce one variety j along the
continuum of IGs. Upon entry, ϕ∈ 0, 1] firms become
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GLCs and 1−ϕ firms become POEs. The firms learn their
production function and cost profile, and then proceeds
to minimize unit marginal cost given the production
function they face. After that, each firm j chooses prices
for the differentiated variety j produced, taking unit cost
as given.
The unit production cost of each variety j in category










where mckj,t is the unit marginal cost of production that is
unique to firm j of category k, and Fkt is the fixed cost of
production incurred in each period t. To capture our
documented empirical stylized fact in Section 1, as well
as in line with other anecdotal evidence (for instance,
Kowalski et al., 2013), we assume the operation of GLCs
to be less efficient but potentially benefitting from the
facilitation of fund-raising activities by the government,













0 , though a GLC's operation can poten-
tially benefit from the government's effort in supporting
the SWF fund-raising activities (measured by the amount
spent, GSWt , adjusted by the steady-state size of the
national resource sector, ~P
O ~O) at a magnitude, μ≥ 1.
In terms of unit production, output of IG j, Ykjt ,
k = POE, GLC is produced by combining labour, Ljt, and











where α ∈ (0, 1) and AYt denotes a technology shock com-




 1−ρA AYt−1 ρAexp εAt , where AY0 > 0, ρA∈ (0, 1)
is the associated AR coefficient, and εAt is a normally dis-
tributed stochastic shock with zero mean and a constant
variance (σ2A).
Cost minimization yields the factor returns, the


























The main systematic difference between the POEs
and the GLCs rests in the process of capital rental and
accumulation. The former rents capital at a rate rPOEt ,8j
from a private capital good producer, while the latter has
access to capital stock financed by the fund-raising activi-
ties of its ‘parent’, the representative SWF, at a rental
rate, rSWt ,8j. In terms of labour, both the POEs and GLCs
are assumed to face perfectly competitive labour market,
and therefore pay a common market wage rate, wt.
We assume that firms face zero nominal price adjust-
ment cost, and chooses price in each period t so as to




Ykjt , subject to
the demand functions (18) and (19). Price settings are
therefore non-forward looking in this economy, allowing
us to compare the contemporary profits of GLCs and
POEs, while minimizing unnecessary complication
brought about by price adjustments (be it Calvo or
Rotemberg style).
Assuming that each firm is small, all firms take aggre-
gate demand and aggregate prices as given. Profit maxi-

















Using Equations (18), (19), (24), and (30), the nomi-




























 	h iμ , ð32Þ
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respectively, where Ω1 = ω−1ð Þω=ωω½ ΛηD.
A typical GLC j makes more nominal (real) non-zero





j,t >1 ). Using Equations (31) and (32), it is
shown in Appendix A that:
Proposition 1. If all privately owned firms make non-
zero, positive profits, when the capital rental rate of
GLC and POE are the same, rSWt = r
POE
t , given that
FPOE0 <F
GLC
0 , there is no feasible solution of govern-
ment spending on the facilitation of SWF fund-
raising activities, in which a typical GLC j makes
more profit than a typical POE j.
Proposition 1 provides a formal derivation that is con-
sistent with anecdotal evidence presented in studies such
as Wen and Wu (2019). In order for a GLC to have the
possibility of making greater profits than a POE, the capi-
tal rental rate between the two firms cannot be the same.
Indeed, analytically, rSWt ≥rPOEt for the existence of
solutions.
2.5 | Private capital good producer
The private capital good producer, owned collectively by
the households, keeps the private capital stock in the
economy and rents to the privately owned firms (POEs)
at the gross rental rate, 1+ rPOEt . The aggregate private




jt dj , is obtained by com-
bining private investments, It, with the existing capital


















where δP ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate, ΘK > 0 the cap-
ital adjustment cost parameter, and AKPt is a random
shock to capital adjustment, governed by an
AR(1) process, AKPt = A
KP
0
 1−ρKP AKPt−1 ρKPexp εKPt ,
where AKP0 > 0 , ρKP∈ (0, 1) is the associated AR coeffi-
cient, and εKPt is the zero-mean error term with a con-
stant variance (σ2KP).
When investments are paid for in advance at the
beginning of period t, the private capital good producer





t di= It . At the end of period, capital pro-
ducer receives the income and fully repays the loans to





ject to Equation (33), the level of investment is chosen to
maximize the present value of the discounted stream of
profits, taking the lending rate, rental rate, prices and
existing stock as given:








where ΠKt+ s denotes nominal profits at end of period
t+ s, defined as ΠKt+ s = Pt+ s 1+ rPOEt+ s
 
KPOEt+ s



































2.6 | Government and GLCs
2.6.1 | Fiscal budget
The government consumes final goods (Gt), saves in a
Resource Fund to hold foreign assets (GRFt ), and spends
on the facilitation of the fund-raising activities of the stra-
tegic holding fund/SWF that owns or holds majority
stakes in the GLCs (GSWt ). The government finances its





tdi ) and issuing one-period government
bonds to households, denoted in real term as bt. The
bonds issued are repaid in gross term – plus interest, iBt−1
– in the next period. The government also receives
resource revenue in the form of royalties [assumed to
involve zero extraction cost, as in Agénor, 2016],
expressed in net term, POt Ot , which is transferred fully to
the fiscal budget. Further, as in the specification of Bems
and de Carvalho Filho (2011), it also receives net interest
rate, iWt−1 , on the stock of foreign-currency assets, Ft− 1,
held abroad in the Resource Fund, as well as real (net)
dividends from its original capitalization in the SWF, V0.
The government's budget constraint is therefore













The general government consumption is assumed to
be a fraction υ ∈ (0, 1) of domestic sales of the
final good:
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Gt = υYSt : ð37Þ
Without explicitly introducing an interest rate-setting
Central Bank, we assume the government sets its domes-
tic bonds rate in a reactionary rule similar to most devel-
oping countries' reference rate-setting (Moura & de
Carvalho, 2010), in that,
iBt = εt i
B
t−1
 ϖ1 ~iB Y t
~Y





where εt denotes a source of random shock with an
AR(1) process, εt = εð Þ1−ρM εt−1ð ÞρMexp εεt
 
, where εεt is
normally distributed with ε having mean one and con-
stant variance (σ2M ). The government adjusts its bonds
rate in each period t, taking account of the deviations in
output and the world interest rate from their respective
steady-state levels. Lastly, following Agénor et al. (2014),
the government is also assumed to keep its real stock of
debt constant (bt = b), and balances its budget by
adjusting lump-sum taxes.
2.6.2 | Resource fund versus state-owned
enterprises
Resource fund
The real value of foreign assets held in period t is accu-
mulated according to:
Ft = 1−χð ÞFt−1 +GRFt , ð39Þ
for an initial F0 ≥ 0, and χ > 0 is the asset management
cost incurred. In each period t, the foreign assets held in
the resource fund earns a net return, assumed to equal
the risk-free world interest rate, iWt . To facilitate our anal-
ysis, we assume GRFt to be a fraction ωRF∈ 0, 1] of the
resource revenue.
The representative SWF
In line with macroeconomic models such as Pieschacón
(2012), Agénor (2016), the relationship between SWF and
the GLCs can be interpreted as the latter being the port-
folio companies of the former, renting capital stock
built by the SWF. Although we recognize that the actual
landscape of the government-linked investment funds
in Malaysia is too complicated to be modelled in a repre-
sentative framework, we believe that the specification
below is sufficient for the purposes a macroeconomic
analysis.6
The representative SWF plays a strategic investment
role, as described in Halland, Noel, Tordo, and Kloper-
Owens (2016). Specifically, in each period it invests in












where δGLC ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate, and the
investment amount, IGLCt , is financed by a combination
of net fund-raising activities from borrowing/debt/
Sukuk-issuance with external high-profile investors,





= IGLCt + r
SW
t V0, ð41Þ




jt−1dj , at a dividend
rate, ξ∈ (0, 1). We assume that the fund-raising activi-
ties with high-profile investors are costly. In order to
facilitate these, the government spends GSWt , as well as
any dividend received from the original capitalization.





t . Given the presence of body such as
the Putrajaya Committee in supporting the GLICs in
Malaysia, as well as the various initiatives of MATRADE
every year, this is a stylistic feature justifiable in the
Malaysia context.
In a symmetric equilibrium, JGLCt−1 =ϕΠ
GLC
jt−1 . Given










 α 1−ωð Þ wt−1
1−α











 	h iμ ,
ð42Þ
where Ω1 = ω−1ð Þω=ωω½ ΛηD.
Consistent with Proposition 1, as well as the empirical
evidence in studies such as Ramirez and Tan (2004),
Feng, Sun, and Tong (2004), and Menon (2014), the novel
model feature is that, rental rate charged on GLCs in
each period t is given by
rSWt = κ0 r
POE
t
 κ1 ΔdSWt κ2 , ð43Þ
where κ0, κ1, κ2 ≥ 0, which depends positively on the
prevailing market interest rate, rPOEt (which can be
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viewed as the opportunity cost of capital rental had the
SOEs borrows from the private market), and on the (net)
addition of borrowings incurred by the SWFs. The latter
means that, the more SWF has to borrow from high-
profile investors, the more expensive their required rate
of returns will be.
Finally, the non-resource primary balance, NBt, is
given by7:
NBt =Tt + rSWt−1V0−Gt: ð44Þ
2.7 | Market-clearing conditions
The domestic final good market equilibrium is
defined as:
YSt =Ct + It +Gt, ð45Þ




































where ρW ∈ (0, 1) is the AR(1) parameter, ~i
W
is an exoge-
nously given rate, and εWt is the random shock with mean
zero and a constant variance (σ2W ).
3 | SYMMETRIC AND STEADY-
STATE EQUILIBRIUM
Definition 1. A symmetric equilibrium is where all indi-
viduals, all SOEs, and all POEs are identical. All
individual and aggregate behaviours are also consis-
tent. These mean, for all individuals i ∈ (0, 1),










t = bt ,
Bi,F,Pt =B
F,P







t for k = POE, GLC. By implica-
tions, all IG firms produce the same output, and
prices, marginal costs, and profits are the same














Definition 2. The steady-state equilibrium is a stationary
symmetric equilibrium in which, for a given set of






































) are all constant 8t; (c) the variables associ-
ated with resource production (~P
O
, ~O) are constant
8t, and by implications, (d) the inflation rate (~π ),
profits and marginal costs are constant 8t. In addi-
tion, in the steady state, all adjustment costs equal











0 , εt = ε0). Similar to
studies such as Agénor et al. (2014), we normalize
the steady-state inflation to ~π=0.
Having defined the symmetric and steady-state equi-
librium, by assuming that GSWt is equivalent to a fraction
ωSW∈ 0, 1] of the resource revenue, we derive Proposi-
tion 2 in Appendix A, which state the following:
Proposition 2. In the symmetric equilibrium, a GLC
makes positive real profits if and only if the fraction
of the government's resource revenue, ωSW, that is









tð Þκ1α 1−ωð Þ
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Pη−1t Y t, and Ω2
= Ω1α−α(1−ω)(1− α)(α− 1)(1−ω). In the steady state, if





~Ψκα 1−ωð Þ0 β
−1−1+ δP
 κ1α 1−ωð Þ
" # 1
μ+ κ2α 1−ωð Þ
: ð49Þ
Assumption. μ + κ2α(1 − ω) ≠ 0. With the assump-
tion, Equations (48) and (49) must be positive for
all reasonable parameter values, hence ω*SW > 0
exists. Given that the right-hand-side of Equa-
tion (48) is influenced by shocks, in all our
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subsequent numerical simulations we check this
condition by first calculating Equation (49), and
then evaluate the solution series computed numeri-
cally using Equation (48) to the threshold value
implied by Equation (49).
4 | CALIBRATION AND
PARAMETER ESTIMATION
The model is estimated with the Bayesian method in the
tradition of Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). We calibrate
the model to the Southeast Asian economy of Malaysia,
using seven quarterly detrended time series for the period
1991Q1-2016Q4 (year 2016 is the latest year for which
actual, and not projected, official population data is avail-
able): real per capita GDP, real per capita consumption,
real per capita private investment, employment, real oil
price, Malaysia's and United States' 10-year government
bond rate.8 These series are obtained from Department of
Statistics (DOS), Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), and Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of St Louis Economic Data (for the
non-Malaysia data series). We use the real per capita
GDP series, together with the domestic output identity,
(22), to identify and construct the real oil production
series. This is mainly due to the non-comparability of
measurement unit between the model variable
(in constant prices, per capita gross value added) and the
extraction data published by PETRONAS in its financial
reports (in barrels per day), with the latter also dated only
back to 2005Q1. Note that PETRONAS Holding (or the
Ministry of Finance Incorporated) is closest to the specifi-
cation of the SWF in this model; therefore, some of the
calibration strategies are based on its data.
To avoid stochastic singularity, the number of struc-
tural shocks equals 7, and in combination with the
dynamic parameters in the relevant equations, means the
overall empirical strategy involves estimating 24 parame-
ters [ς, ϰ, ΘK, μ, μF, κ1, κ2,ϖ1,ϖ2,ϖ3, 7 AR(1) parameters,
and 7 standard deviation parameters]. The remaining
parameters are calibrated to match the initial steady-state
value of variables to first moment of annual data. Given
that prices are not forward-looking in the model, and that
Malaysia has historically maintained a very steady and
low inflation rate, for analytical simplification a zero-
inflation steady state is derived in Appendix B.
The calibrated parameters are summarized in Table 1.
The discount factor, β = 0.988, corresponds to a steady-
state domestic bonds' rate, ~i
B
, that matches average quar-
terly 10-year government bond rate. The preference
parameter, ηN, is set to 4.5, as in Agénor et al. (2014). The
spread parameter for foreign bond returns, θF0 , is set at a
very low value of 0.01, so that the rate of return on
privately held foreign bonds approximates the risk-free
world interest rate, ~i
W
. On production, the distribution
parameter, ΛD, and the GLCs' share in domestic produc-
tion, ϕ, are set to 0.7 and 0.4 respectively, in line with the
averages observed in the Annual Surveys of Manufactur-
ing Industries published by DOS. For the elasticities of
substitution, first, we set the across-variety (domestic-for-
eign) elasticity, η = 0.8, following Agénor et al. (2014)
and in line with the empirical estimates of Antràs (2004).
From Zeufack and Lim (2013), the average profit margin
of Malaysian firms is 0.2544. This yields a mark-up of
1.3412, which in turn, gives ω = 3.93. We set the within-
foreign IG elasticity to θ = 3.93 too, hence establishing a
benchmark of ω, θ> η, consistent with the ‘within-var-
iety> across-variety’ specifications of Brambilla, Hale,
and Long (2009). The elasticity with respect to physical
capital stock, α = 0.35, is fairly standard and consistent
with the macroeconomic data of Malaysia. We set the
TABLE 1 Benchmark calibrated parameter values
Parameter Value Description
Households
β 0.988 Discount factor
ηN 4.5 Preference parameter for leisure
θF0 0.01 Spread parameter, household foreign
bonds
Production
ΛD 0.7 Distribution parameter, final good
θ 3.93 Elasticity of substitution, within
imported IGs
ϕ 0.4 GLC share in domestic production
ω 3.93 Elasticity of substitution, within domestic
IGs
η 0.8 Elasticity of substitution, foreign-
domestic IGs
α 0.35 Elasticity wrt physical capital stock
Private capital good producer
δP 0.017 Depreciation rate, physical capital stock
Government and state-owned enterprises
υ 0.122 Share of gov. spending in domestic
output sales
δGLC 0.017 Depreciation rate, physical capital stock
ξ 0.08 Dividend raid
κ0 1.0 Shift parameter, SWF rental rate
ωSW 0.374 Resource revenue share, domestic fund-
facilitation
ωRF 0.186 Resource revenue share, resource fund
χ 0.05 Administrative cost in managing foreign
assets
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two depreciation rates, δSOE = δP = 0.017, which is con-
sistent with the annual depreciation rate of 0.068 calcu-
lated from PETRONAS's financials, and in Lim (2019).
The share of government spending in domestic output
sales, υ = 0.122, is calculated from macroeconomic data,
whereas ξ = 0.8 and κ0 = 1.0 are set (in the absence of
corresponding data) so as to match the steady-state GLC
capital stock to the average real value of PETRONAS's
property, plant, equipments in the 2010–2017 period.9 For
the fraction of the resource revenue equivalent to the
spending in facilitating fund-raising activities of the SWF,
ωSW, and the fraction invested in foreign assets, ωRF, we
utilize publicly available information from the Annual
Reports of PETRONAS in the same period. Specifically,
investment breakdown by geographical segments are
used as proxy, with the benchmark fraction invested in
foreign assets, ωRF, estimated using the annual total
investments made outside of Malaysia, yielding an aver-
age of 0.186. Next, from the Economic Reports published
annually by the Ministry of Finance Malaysia, we obtain
real figures for the residual oil royalties spent on govern-
ment operating expenditure, 1−ωSOE−ωRF. Combining
these two information, ωSOE = 0.374.
For the Bayesian-estimated dynamic parameters,
Table 2 reports the prior and posterior distributional
forms, means, and standard deviations. The priors on
these parameters are chosen so that they are in line with
existing studies and harmonized across different shocks.
Moreover, the choices of prior distributions take into con-
sideration the parameters' domain and prior means, as in
the existing literature. First, given the well-documented
mixed empirical evidence (Havranek, Horvath, Irsova, &
TABLE 2 Summary statistics for prior and posterior distribution of parameters
Prior Posterior
Description PDF Mean SD Mean SD
Structural parameters
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution ς Gamma 0.5 0.2 1.55 0.254
Private capital adjustment cost parameter ΘK Gamma 100 50 158.6 34.88
Economies of scale, GLC fixed cost μ Gamma 7.0 2.0 6.75 1.894
Pass-through parameter μF Beta 0.3 0.1 0.40 0.109
Elasticity of exports wrt exchange rate ϰ Gamma 0.7 0.2 1.73 0.275
SWF rental rate, wrt market rate κ1 Beta 0.7 0.2 0.80 0.150
SWF rental rate, wrt corporate debt change κ2 Beta 0.3 0.2 0.49 0.117
Elasticity of gov reference rate, lagged rate ϖ1 Beta 0.7 0.15 0.86 0.070
Elasticity of gov reference rate, output ϖ2 Gamma 0.2 0.1 0.22 0.104
Elasticity of gov reference rate, risk-free rate ϖ3 Gamma 0.3 0.1 0.10 0.058
Shock persistence parameters
Productivity shock ρA Beta 0.5 0.2 0.70 0.041
Preference shock ρU Beta 0.5 0.2 0.84 0.027
Bond reference rate-setting shock ρM Beta 0.5 0.2 0.10 0.058
POE investment/capital accumulation ρKP Beta 0.5 0.2 0.65 0.077
World interest rate shock ρW Beta 0.5 0.2 0.34 0.068
Commodity price-specific ρPO Beta 0.5 0.2 0.59 0.057
Resource production-specific ρO Beta 0.5 0.2 0.72 0.052
Stochastic shock standard deviation parameters
Productivity shock σA Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.94 0.069
Preference shock σU Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.49 0.107
Bond reference rate-setting shock σM Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.09 0.007
POE investment/capital accumulation σKP Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.06 0.005
World interest rate shock σW Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.10 0.007
Commodity price-specific σPO Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 1.51 0.106
Resource production-specific σO Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 2.67 0.190
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Rusnak, 2015), the prior mean for the (inverse) inter-
temporal elasticity of substitution is set at 0.5, in line with
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) and Jin (2012). This is so as to
let the time series data dictates the country-specific poste-
rior estimate. The prior mean for the exchange rate pass-
through, μF, is set at 0.3, in line with the estimates of Soto
and Selaive (2003). The prior mean for exchange rate
elasticity of exports, ϰ = 0.7, is in line with the country-
level estimates of Ahmed, Appendino, and Ruta (2015).
For the government bond rate-setting parameters, the
prior means of ϖ1 = 0.7, ϖ2 = 0.2, ϖ3 = 0.3 are consis-
tent with the Taylor-type rules literature for developing
economies, such as Moura and de Carvalho (2010),
Agénor et al. (2014). The prior mean of the capital adjust-
ment cost parameter, ΘK, is set at a large value of 100, fol-
lowing Hristov and Hülsewig (2017). For the prior means
of the SOE-related parameters, μ = 7.0, κ1 = 0.7, κ2 = 0.3
are set as priors. From Equation (43), the choice of the
latter two means a market interest rate of 0.03 would
yield a reasonable SOE rental rate of 0.0375. These
parameter choices yield a non-resource primary balance
of −4.9% of GDP, which matches Malaysia's actual fiscal
position.
Following Ojeda-Joya et al. (2016) and Hristov and
Hülsewig (2017), we give relatively large prior variance to
structural parameters so that the kurtosis of posterior dis-
tributions is not heavily influenced by prior means: the
data can therefore ‘speak for themselves’. For the shock
persistence and standard deviation parameters, our
choices of prior means are consistent with the existing
Bayesian DSGE literature [for instance, Christiano,
Eichenbaum, & Evans, 2005, Geweke, 1999, 2005,
Smets & Wouters, 2003, 2007; Smets & Villa, 2016], as
well as notable emerging countries' business-cycle studies
such as García-Cicco, Pancrazi, and Uribe (2010). Specifi-
cally, we assume Beta distribution with 0.5 mean and 0.2
standard deviation for the AR(1) parameters, and
inverse-gamma distribution with 0.1 mean and 2.0 stan-
dard deviation for the standard deviation parameters.
Given that, to our knowledge, the only existing esti-
mated DSGE model for Malaysia (Alp, Elekdag, &
Lall, 2012) covers only the short period of 2000–2010 and
is developed to study vastly different issues, the estimated
posterior means are largely assessed against the afore-
mentioned studies in the Dutch Disease literature, such as
Berg et al. (2013), Araujo et al. (2016), Agénor (2016), as
well as country-specific empirical estimates. Diagnostic
tests for the convergence of the Markov chains of the
parameters are also performed using sample drawn from
the Metropolis-Hasting algorithm, in line with
Geweke (1999, 2005). Our estimation results give a poste-
rior mean of ς = 1.55, which yields ς−1 = 0.645 and there-
fore higher than the 0.173 documented in Havranek
et al. (2015) for Malaysia using meta-analyses.10 Next, the
posterior mean for the exchange rate elasticity of exports,
ϰ = 1.73, is at the upper-end of the empirical estimates of
Ahmed et al. (2015), but within-range of the country-
specific estimates of Kumar (2011) and Tsen (2011). For
the other 8 parameters, save for the novel variable of
GLCs' capital rental rate elasticity, estimated at κ2 = 0.49,
the estimated posterior means are within reasonable
range of the prior means imposed, indicating good fits.
For the shock parameters, we find pronounced differ-
ences in persistence and volatility of various shocks.
Among the seven shocks examined, the reference rate-
setting and the world interest rate shocks are the least
persistent [AR(1) parameters of 0.10 and 0.34 respec-
tively], while the preference shock is the most [AR
(1) parameter equal to 0.84]. The other four shocks have
AR(1) parameters ranging from 0.34 to 0.72, all within
reasonable range expected from the Malaysian business
cycle in the past 20 years. In comparison to the small-
sample estimates of Alp et al. (2012), which covers only
10 years, the overall shock persistence estimates appear
to be smaller when the structural shocks of the natural
resources sector are accounted for. In terms of volatility,
we find both commodity shocks to be very large (poste-
rior mean of standard deviation for oil price shock is
1.51, and for production shock, 2.67), indicating poten-
tially large impact (compared to the other shocks) on the
Malaysian business cycle. Nevertheless, such magnitudes
have been commonly observed in the Dutch Disease liter-
ature. All the other standard-deviation parameters have
estimated posterior means that approximate the specified
priors. For instance, σA = 0.94 and σU = 0.49 are esti-
mated for the productivity and preference shocks, which
are within a reasonable range (posterior standard devia-
tions of the estimated mean are less than 0.107).
5 | ANALYSIS
Based on the estimated model, we first examine how key
variables react to exogenous unanticipated disturbances
in the economy using variance decomposition and
impulse response analysis. The results observed provide
the necessary business-cycle context for the model econ-
omy in guiding the subsequent optimal analysis. For
robustness, we further implement an alternative
Bayesian-estimation analysis that accounts for measure-
ment errors in observed variables, as in An and
Schorfheide (2007). Next, we evaluate Proposition 2
numerically to identify a threshold value, ω*SW above
which GLCs are profitable.11 After that, the optimality
considerations are analysed in the context of the minimi-
zation of a fundamental social loss function, which takes
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into account of both macroeconomic stability and con-
sumption volatility [argued in Agénor, 2016 as a better
welfare criterion to account for the revealed preference of
developing-economy policymakers than pure utility-
based measures].
5.1 | Variance decomposition and
impulse responses
Table 3 reports the unconditional variance decomposition









t ), consumption, investment,
rental rates of physical capital stock (rSWt ,r
POE
t ), bonds'
reference rate, inflation rate, profits (ΠGLCt ,Π
POE
t ),
resource fund size (Ft), and exchange rate in the esti-
mated model. First, similar to what is commonly
observed for the business cycles of developing economies
(García-Cicco et al., 2010), both preference and produc-
tivity shocks are key drivers to changes in many variables
in the economy, with the former largely dominating the
latter. For instance, both shocks combine to account for
90% of the variation in domestic inflation rate, and over
60% of the variations in final good, domestic production,
exports, imported IGs, and the movements in exchange
rate. In addition, the two commodity shocks (both pro-
duction and price shocks) are found to play significant
roles in driving the Malaysian business cycle. Conditional
on the simplistic specification of the evolution of resource
extraction in the model (in practice, the effects of both
are intertwined), between the two, oil production shock
plays a larger role than the WTI crude oil price-proxied
price shock, indicating the dominant role of PETRONAS
and GLCs in driving the Malaysian business cycle.
Indeed, in terms of variation in final good, Yt, the combi-
nation of the resources shocks account for 21.91%, which
trails only preference shock (42.7%). These results are
consistent with the economic structure and historical per-
formance of Malaysia – predominantly GLC-driven yet
possesses a relatively robust private consumption of com-
ponents [see, for instance, Nawawi, 2018, Government of
Malaysia, 2006, 2012]. Further, despite a purely exoge-
nous specification, the resources shocks account for over
90% of the variations in the GLC- and POE-intermediate
goods' production, the SWF-specific rental rates, the
Resource Fund's asset size, and most importantly, both
GLC and POE profits in the economy. Such a dominant
role of resources shocks in driving the business cycle is
consistent with non-estimated models in studies such as
Araujo et al. (2016) and Agénor (2016). The role of the
commodity shocks in being the main drivers of the varia-
tions in POEs' profitability, investment, rental rate, and
employment share is also inconsistent with empirical
documentations of the industrial structure in Malaysia:

















Final good, Yt 21.45 0.31 1.46 7.74 42.70 12.16 14.17
Domestic IGs, YDt 50.72 0.50 2.28 5.14 20.40 10.10 10.87
GLC IGs, YGLCt 0.31 0.00 0.03 14.00 1.03 0.05 84.57
POE IGs, YPOEt 0.57 0.01 0.05 13.20 1.40 0.15 84.62
Exports, YXt 51.37 1.48 19.39 0.63 24.48 1.27 1.39
Imported IGs, YFt 3.24 0.28 4.91 7.56 61.25 10.09 12.67
Consumption, Ct 4.64 0.06 3.54 8.29 27.53 2.63 53.32
Investment, It 0.75 0.02 1.19 16.19 14.28 18.60 48.98
SWF required return, rSWt 0.29 0.01 0.07 18.83 3.71 0.14 76.95
Private rental rate, rPOEt 1.27 0.06 0.29 14.31 16.48 0.63 66.96
Policy/reference rate, iBt 8.40 0.19 51.66 2.12 27.40 4.68 5.54
Inflation rate, πt 26.70 0.45 0.84 1.70 65.92 1.30 3.09
GLC profits, ΠGLCt 0.08 0.00 0.03 16.19 1.64 0.05 82.01
POE profits, ΠPOEt 0.25 0.03 0.21 13.08 8.98 0.30 77.13
Resource fund, Ft 0.00 0.00 0.00 13.49 0.00 0.00 86.51
Exchange rate, Et 5.47 1.24 4.80 3.72 59.68 1.39 23.70
LIM AND ZHANG 13
GLCs are industrial leaders and dominant players, hence
dictating business terms and influencing private profit-
ability (Menon, 2014; Zeufack & Lim, 2013).
A potential criticism of these macroeconomic data-
driven findings is that Malaysia is not very resource-
dependent and many of its GLICs hold equity stakes
across horizontally diversified sectors. While these can be
easily countered by the fact that oil revenue as a percent-
age of total government revenue in Malaysia averages at
24.6% over our sample period, reaching as high as 35.5%
during the 2006–2014 period (not including any multi-
plier effect associated with backward and forward-
TABLE 4 Summary statistics for prior and posterior distribution of parameters (alternative est.)
Description
Prior Posterior
PDF Mean SD Mean SD
Structural parameters
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution ς Gamma 0.5 0.2 1.69 0.332
Private capital adjustment cost parameter ΘK Gamma 100 50 191.9 40.79
Economies of scale, GLC fixed cost μ Gamma 7.0 2.0 6.64 1.86
Pass-through parameter μF Beta 0.3 0.1 0.35 0.11
Elasticity of exports wrt exchange rate ϰ Gamma 0.7 0.2 1.36 0.26
SWF rental rate, wrt market rate κ1 Beta 0.7 0.2 0.80 0.150
SWF rental rate, wrt corporate debt change κ2 Beta 0.3 0.2 0.56 0.119
Elasticity of gov reference rate, lagged rate ϖ1 Beta 0.7 0.15 0.85 0.100
Elasticity of gov reference rate, output ϖ2 Gamma 0.2 0.1 0.22 0.105
Elasticity of gov reference rate, risk-free rate ϖ3 Gamma 0.3 0.1 0.14 0.077
Shock persistence parameters
Productivity shock ρA Beta 0.5 0.2 0.81 0.036
Preference shock ρU Beta 0.5 0.2 0.84 0.034
Bond reference rate-setting shock ρM Beta 0.5 0.2 0.46 0.278
POE investment/capital accumulation ρKP Beta 0.5 0.2 0.76 0.074
World interest rate shock ρW Beta 0.5 0.2 0.32 0.072
Commodity price-specific ρPO Beta 0.5 0.2 0.60 0.057
Resource production-specific ρO Beta 0.5 0.2 0.78 0.042
Stochastic shock standard deviation parameters
Productivity shock σA Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.67 0.071
Preference shock σU Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.43 0.094
Bond reference rate-setting shock σM Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.06 0.011
POE investment/capital accumulation σKP Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.03 0.005
World interest rate shock σW Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.09 0.008
Commodity price-specific σPO Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 1.51 0.106
Resource production-specific σO Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 2.44 0.191
Measurement error parameters
Output obs. error vol. σeY Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 1.21 0.153
Consumption obs. error vol. σeC Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.13 0.150
Inv. obs. error vol. σeI Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.09 0.082
Labour obs. error vol. σeL Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.06 0.021
Reference rate obs. error vol. σer Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.05 0.008
World interest rate obs. error vol. σew Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.04 0.008
Resource price obs. error vol. σePO Inv-gamma 0.1 2.0 0.08 0.052
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linkages), we implement a further robustness check by
Bayesian-estimating the model again using the methodol-
ogy of An and Schorfheide (2007). Particularly, we con-
sider the possibility that elements not captured by this
model may be absorbed by shock processes, such as the
resource shocks, and hence affect our estimation results.
The inclusion of measurement errors is then useful to iso-
late the variation of observed variables arising from non-
captured variables.
Table 4 presents the estimation results with measure-
ment errors. In comparison to Table 2, it is obvious that
the estimated posterior mean values of the structural
parameters and shock processes are consistent with the
benchmark results. Further, the measurement errors for
the majority of observed variables appear to be negligible,
apart from the output. However, as illustrated in
Figure 1, the model-implied output path (in logs) traces
closely to the actual data, which means that this is also
immaterial to the overall results. These findings, there-
fore, indicate that unaccounted factors are unlikely to
fundamentally change our benchmark results. Indeed,
Table 5 presents the variance decomposition analysis
using this alternative estimation method. Despite some
slight numerical differences, all the qualitative findings
documented earlier remain robust and minimally
affected by measurement errors associated with omitted
variables. In other words, the significance of resource
shocks in driving the Malaysian business cycle remains
robust, despite the economy having a much more diversi-
fied structure than OPEC economies.
Next, we examine the impulse responses of the seven
shocks, where a 1% temporary increase in the relevant
standard deviation is simulated for each case. For illustra-
tion, four cases of temporary shocks are presented: pro-
ductivity shock, preference shock, world interest rate
shock, and commodity price shock, as in Figures 2–5
respectively. The first three are main business-cycle
shocks typically considered in a small open economy,
while the commodity price shock is the main source of
cyclical dynamics in this economy.12 Figure 2 shows that,
following a classic positive productivity shock, output,
consumption, and profits all rise, though both the physi-
cal capital rental rates fall, implying a lower utilization
rate. The inflation rate is also lower temporarily in the
short run. On the other hand, following a positive prefer-
ence shock, in Figure 3 we see that output, consumption,
and profits increase too. The difference from the supply-
side shock is that both the capital rental rates increase in
this case due to the higher capital utilization arisen from
a higher demand. The exchange rate effect is also positive
due to the derived exports demand associated with higher
domestic demand. Both sets of results in Figures 2 and 3
are consistent with observations in conventional models
such as Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007). In Figure 4, fol-
lowing an increase in world interest rate, the combina-
tion of a reallocation of household portfolio towards
foreign assets and the higher domestic bond rate set
[as in Equation (38)] results in a temporary dampening
effect on production and by implications, the profitability
of both GLCs and POEs. Although external risk is not a
key focus in this article, the interest-rate responses and
real contractionary effects observed are consistent with
the results in external risk-focused open economy
models, such as Mendoza (2010), Agénor et al. (2014,
2018). Lastly, Figure 5 presents the impulse response
results associated with a temporary increase in com-
modity price. Despite the novel introduction of a repre-
sentative SWF and its portfolio GLCs, overall the
responses of macroeconomic variables are in line with
the Dutch Disease literature (Agénor, 2016; van der
Ploeg & Venables, 2011, 2013), which include an
expansionary effect on final good, temporary spike in
cost-push inflation, and the classic real exchange rate
appreciation.
FIGURE 1 Comparing model-
implied output with data [Colour figure
can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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Final good, Yt 13.76 0.34 3.46 11.94 54.34 7.50 8.66
Domestic IGs, YDt 46.20 0.61 2.91 8.16 26.96 7.80 7.37
GLC IGs, YGLCt 0.15 0.00 0.03 12.22 0.55 0.02 87.04
POE IGs, YPOEt 0.22 0.00 0.04 11.36 0.73 0.05 87.60
Exports, YXt 54.60 1.90 25.77 0.88 13.29 1.89 1.67
Imported IGs, YFt 1.27 0.37 10.53 10.18 66.60 4.52 6.53
Consumption, Ct 2.66 0.05 3.43 8.76 16.00 1.88 67.22
Investment, It 1.69 0.02 1.20 22.46 8.90 9.45 56.28
SWF required return, rSWt 0.30 0.01 0.07 19.49 2.21 0.03 77.88
Private rental rate, rPOEt 1.27 0.03 0.31 15.55 9.25 0.14 73.44
Policy/reference rate, iBt 8.64 0.15 42.38 3.69 36.87 4.01 4.26
Inflation rate, πt 24.06 0.50 1.60 2.11 69.13 0.38 2.22
GLC profits, ΠGLCt 0.02 0.00 0.03 14.99 0.95 0.01 84.00
POE profits, ΠPOEt 0.08 0.02 0.19 12.30 4.61 0.07 82.74
Resource fund, Ft 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.63 0.00 0.00 88.37
Exchange rate, Et 7.39 1.24 5.47 4.10 50.41 1.11 30.28
FIGURE 2 Impulse response: temporary productivity shock (one standard deviation increase) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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FIGURE 3 Impulse response: temporary preference shock (one standard deviation increase) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
FIGURE 4 Impulse response: temporary world interest-rate shock (one standard deviation increase) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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5.2 | Optimal allocation
Having estimated key model parameters and then solved
for both the dynamic system and steady-state solutions
(see Appendices A and B), we evaluate the theoretical
conditions determining SOE profitability using the ana-
lytically derived expressions for Proposition 2. It is
straightforward to calculate a positive threshold value of
ω*SW, which depends on the fixed cost value, F
GLC
0 . In the
benchmark calibration discussed, FGLC0 is determined
residually from the steady-state expression of (42), yield-
ing FGLC0 = 0:0013 . From Equation (49), this requires a
threshold value of ωSW = 0.480. Given that ωSW = 0.374
in the benchmark, this means in the benchmark steady-
state equilibrium solved for the calibrated Malaysian
economy, a typical GLC does not make a profit. Never-
theless, from Equation (48), the procyclicality of GLC
profitability (to commodity shocks) is easily observed.
For instance, during a ‘resource boom’ period when
POt Ot=~P
O~O=1:5, a much lower threshold ω*SW = 0:324
<ωSW = 0:374 is obtained, indicating a period when
SOEs are making positive profits. This resource
procyclicality of GLC profitability – and by implications,
their higher capital reinvestment behaviours during
resource boom – is entirely consistent with the empirical
evidence documented in Arezki and Ismail (2013).
Indeed, for the calibrated Malaysian economy, a
threshold ratio of 1.3178 can be established numerically:
in any given year, a typical GLC makes positive profits if
and only if the resource royalties generated is 31.78%
higher than its steady-state value.
Next, we examine for optimal allocation of resource
wealth. Specifically, suppose 44% of resource revenue is
spent on other operating expenditure by the government
in each period, and the remaining 56% is allocated
between ωSW and ωRF, as in the benchmark calibration.
Let φ ∈ (0, 1) be the fraction of resource wealth spent on
facilitation of fund-raising activities of SWF and 1 − φ on
foreign asset investment in the resource fund, to address
this, following Agénor (2016), we define a fundamental
social loss function:








which is a weighted geometric average of the volatility of
private consumption, σφC (welfare consideration for risk-
averse households), and the volatility of the non-resource
primary balance, σφNB (a macroeconomic stability crite-
rion), normalized with respect to the respective volatility
measures (σBC , σ
B
NB ) corresponding to a shock in the
benchmark case with baseline resource wealth allocation.
Γ∈ 0, 1] is the policy weight. A government that concerns
FIGURE 5 Impulse response: temporary resource price shock (one standard deviation increase) [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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only about household welfare corresponds to Γ = 1,
whereas a regime with pure fiscal-stability goal corre-
sponds to Γ = 0.13
Given that the main feature of resource windfalls is
that these are largely temporary (see, for instance, van
der Ploeg & Venables, 2011, 2013), the primary assess-
ment of an optimal φ involves comparing the social loss
function values across different φ (indirectly, various
combination of ωSW, ωRF ≤ 0.56) when a temporary one
standard deviation negative shock to commodity price is
simulated. Table 6 presents the summary results in which
the values of the social loss function (50) are calculated
for the combination of (φ, Γ) on the basis of (uncondi-
tional) asymptotic variances, hence accounting for the
volatility of private consumption and non-resource
primary balance throughout the entire solution path.
Although the results show a clear decreasing function
with respect to Γ (the greater emphasis policymakers
placed on stabilizing consumption path, à la the PIH tra-
dition, the smaller the losses during the periods of short-
fall), it has a convex shape in φ for a given Γ. In other
words, an interior optimal combination of allocation
exists. Intuitively, in the initial domain of φ, an increase
in the allocation to the facilitation of domestic fund-
raising activities would help stabilizing the production of
the GLCs and consequently consumption, despite the
temporary fall in oil revenue putting pressure on fiscal
balance. Nevertheless, as φ increases beyond the optimal
φ value, the net effect from the social losses associated
with the increased volatility in GLC profitability would
TABLE 6 Optimal allocation of resource revenue between resource fund and SWF fund-raising facilitation
Social loss function value Γ
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
φ 0.1 1.1939 1.0185 0.8688 0.7412 0.6323 0.5394 0.4601 0.3925 0.3348 0.2856 0.2437
0.2 1.1470 0.9996 0.8711 0.7592 0.6616 0.5766 0.5025 0.4379 0.3817 0.3326 0.2899
0.3 1.1750 1.0554 0.9480 0.8516 0.7649 0.6871 0.6172 0.5544 0.4980 0.4473 0.4018
0.4 1.2341 1.1405 1.0540 0.9740 0.9001 0.8318 0.7687 0.7104 0.6565 0.6067 0.5607
0.5 1.3145 1.2445 1.1783 1.1156 1.0562 1.0000 0.9468 0.8964 0.8487 0.8035 0.7608
0.6 1.4128 1.3644 1.3177 1.2725 1.2289 1.1868 1.1461 1.1069 1.0689 1.0323 0.9969
0.7 1.5269 1.4985 1.4706 1.4432 1.4163 1.3899 1.3641 1.3387 1.3137 1.2893 1.2653
0.8 1.6562 1.6465 1.6368 1.6272 1.6177 1.6082 1.5988 1.5894 1.5801 1.5708 1.5616
0.9 1.8003 1.8083 1.8164 1.8245 1.8327 1.8408 1.8491 1.8573 1.8656 1.8740 1.8823
Social loss function, weight between 0.06 and 0.20
φ 0.06 1.2917 1.1034 0.9426 0.8052 0.6878 0.5876 0.5019 0.4288 0.3663 0.3129 0.2673
0.07 1.2562 1.0716 0.9141 0.7797 0.6651 0.5674 0.4840 0.4128 0.3521 0.3004 0.2562
0.08 1.2298 1.0485 0.8939 0.7621 0.6497 0.5539 0.4722 0.4026 0.3432 0.2926 0.2495
0.09 1.2096 1.0313 0.8792 0.7496 0.6391 0.5449 0.4645 0.3961 0.3377 0.2879 0.2454
0.10 1.1939 1.0185 0.8688 0.7412 0.6323 0.5394 0.4601 0.3925 0.3348 0.2856 0.2437
0.11 1.1816 1.0090 0.8615 0.7356 0.6281 0.5363 0.4580 0.3910 0.3339 0.2851 0.2434
0.12 1.1720 1.0021 0.8569 0.7327 0.6265 0.5357 0.4581 0.3917 0.3349 0.2864 0.2449
0.13 1.1644 0.9972 0.8541 0.7315 0.6264 0.5365 0.4595 0.3935 0.3370 0.2886 0.2472
0.14 1.1586 0.9942 0.8532 0.7322 0.6283 0.5392 0.4627 0.3971 0.3407 0.2924 0.2509
0.15 1.1542 0.9927 0.8538 0.7343 0.6316 0.5432 0.4672 0.4019 0.3456 0.2973 0.2557
0.16 1.1509 0.9922 0.8553 0.7373 0.6356 0.5479 0.4724 0.4072 0.3510 0.3026 0.2609
0.17 1.1487 0.9928 0.8580 0.7415 0.6409 0.5539 0.4787 0.4137 0.3575 0.3090 0.2671
0.18 1.1474 0.9943 0.8616 0.7466 0.6469 0.5606 0.4858 0.4209 0.3648 0.3161 0.2739
0.19 1.1469 0.9966 0.8661 0.7527 0.6541 0.5684 0.4940 0.4293 0.3731 0.3242 0.2817
0.20 1.1470 0.9996 0.8711 0.7592 0.6616 0.5766 0.5025 0.4379 0.3817 0.3326 0.2899
Note: A temporary one standard deviation, negative shock to resource price. The social loss function value is normalized to the value of 1.0 at the combination
of (0.5, 0.5).
Bold values indicates the loss-minimising combination of parameters.
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outweigh the gains. This then makes the traditional
‘overseas stabilization fund’ option relatively more bene-
ficiary. This volatility trade-off means a ‘non-corner solu-
tion’ combination of φ is warranted when managing
resource price shock – a result that is fundamentally sim-
ilar in spirit to Agénor (2016), despite the complications
of a stochastic shock and the addition of GLCs creating
competitive pressure to the private firms. Specifically, in
the context of our estimated model, a range of φ ∈ 0.11,
0.19] is found to minimize the social loss function, or
equivalently, ωSW ∈ (0.062, 0.106). Fundamentally, this is
similar to the earliest contributions in Dutch Disease: if
resource price volatility is the only policy concern, then
the bulk of any savings from resource windfall ought to
be invested into foreign assets.
However, in contrast to Agénor (2016), whose results
and counterfactual analysis are based on altering deep
parameters (the shocks generated are therefore determin-
istic, not stochastic), we find that the optimal allocation
depends on the nature of the stochastic shock considered.
For instance, when we ‘let the data speak’ and evaluate
the optimal allocation based on a temporary one standard
deviation negative preference shock (the primary shock
in the economy, as it dominates the variations in final
good production, consumption, inflation, and exchange
rate), although an interior optimal φ remains, it is at a
higher value of φ = 0.38, or equivalently, ωSW = 0.213
(see Table 7). This suggests that what constitutes an opti-
mal resource savings allocation would ultimately depend
on the nature of the dominant business-cycle shock of
TABLE 7 Optimal allocation of resource revenue between resource fund and SWF fund-raising facilitation
Social loss function value Γ
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
φ 0.1 6.5896 4.6884 3.3357 2.3733 1.6885 1.2014 0.8547 0.6081 0.4327 0.3078 0.2190
0.2 6.5493 4.5462 3.1558 2.1906 1.5206 1.0555 0.7327 0.5086 0.3531 0.2451 0.1701
0.3 6.5399 4.4982 3.0939 2.1280 1.4637 1.0067 0.6925 0.4763 0.3276 0.2253 0.1550
0.4 6.5402 4.4873 3.0788 2.1124 1.4494 0.9944 0.6823 0.4681 0.3212 0.2204 0.1512
0.5 6.5448 4.4949 3.0870 2.1201 1.4561 1.0000 0.6868 0.4717 0.3239 0.2225 0.1528
0.6 6.5518 4.5158 3.1126 2.1454 1.4787 1.0192 0.7025 0.4842 0.3337 0.2300 0.1585
0.7 6.5601 4.5403 3.1424 2.1749 1.5053 1.0418 0.7211 0.4991 0.3454 0.2391 0.1655
0.8 6.5692 4.5683 3.1769 2.2092 1.5363 1.0684 0.7430 0.5167 0.3593 0.2499 0.1738
0.9 6.5788 4.5981 3.2137 2.2462 1.5699 1.0972 0.7669 0.5360 0.3746 0.2618 0.1830
Social loss function, weight between 0.30 and 0.45
φ 0.30 6.5399 4.4982 3.0939 2.1280 1.4637 1.0067 0.6925 0.4763 0.3276 0.2253 0.1550
0.31 6.5397 4.4955 3.0903 2.1243 1.4603 1.0039 0.6901 0.4744 0.3261 0.2242 0.1541
0.32 6.5395 4.4932 3.0872 2.1212 1.4574 1.0014 0.6880 0.4727 0.3248 0.2232 0.1533
0.33 6.5393 4.4918 3.0853 2.1193 1.4557 0.9999 0.6868 0.4718 0.3240 0.2226 0.1529
0.34 6.5393 4.4899 3.0839 2.1177 1.4544 0.9981 0.6855 0.4709 0.3236 0.2221 0.1523
0.35 6.5393 4.4896 3.0823 2.1162 1.4528 0.9975 0.6848 0.4701 0.3228 0.2216 0.1521
0.36 6.5394 4.4880 3.0801 2.1139 1.4507 0.9956 0.6833 0.4690 0.3218 0.2209 0.1516
0.37 6.5395 4.4870 3.0786 2.1124 1.4493 0.9944 0.6823 0.4682 0.3212 0.2204 0.1512
0.38 6.5397 4.4867 3.0781 2.1118 1.4488 0.9940 0.6819 0.4679 0.3210 0.2202 0.1511
0.39 6.5399 4.4868 3.0783 2.1119 1.4489 0.9940 0.6820 0.4679 0.3210 0.2202 0.1511
0.40 6.5402 4.4873 3.0788 2.1124 1.4494 0.9944 0.6823 0.4681 0.3212 0.2204 0.1512
0.41 6.5405 4.4875 3.0789 2.1124 1.4490 0.9941 0.6820 0.4679 0.3210 0.2202 0.1511
0.42 6.5409 4.4877 3.0790 2.1125 1.4494 0.9945 0.6823 0.4681 0.3212 0.2204 0.1512
0.43 6.5413 4.4881 3.0794 2.1128 1.4496 0.9946 0.6824 0.4682 0.3213 0.2204 0.1512
0.44 6.5417 4.4891 3.0806 2.1140 1.4507 0.9955 0.6831 0.4688 0.3217 0.2208 0.1515
0.45 6.5421 4.4900 3.0816 2.1150 1.4515 0.9962 0.6837 0.4693 0.3221 0.2210 0.1517
Note: A temporary one standard deviation, negative preference shock. The social loss function value is normalized to the value of 1.0 at the combination of
(0.5, 0.5).
Bold values indicates the loss-minimising combination of parameters.
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concern. Nevertheless, in the specific context of Malaysia,
it appears that the present allocation is sub-optimal,
regardless of the structural shocks considered. This sug-
gests that the Malaysian economy might have hit its
absorptive capacity constraint (i.e., a domestic economy
saturated by GLCs), therefore requiring greater allocation
of savings from resource revenue to foreign assets invest-
ment abroad to be socially optimal.
6 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
We contribute to the broad literature on fiscal manage-
ment of resource wealth by developing a DSGE model
with SWF-financed GLCs – a lasting phenomenon in
emerging economies that, to date, have received very lit-
tle attention from macroeconomists. Based on a
Bayesian-estimated model, we identify an optimal combi-
nation of allocation of excess resource savings between
the offshore Resource Fund and domestic facilitation of
SWF's fund-raising activities (indirectly in relation to its
portfolio GLCs' production). It appears that the present
allocation is sub-optimal, regardless of the structural
shocks considered. This suggests that the Malaysian
economy might have hit its absorptive capacity constraint
(i.e., a domestic economy saturated by GLCs), therefore
requiring greater allocation of savings from resource rev-
enue to foreign assets investment abroad to be socially
optimal. Other key findings have also been previewed in
the introduction and need not be repeated. Instead, we
identify potential avenue for extensions and future
research.
First, although the model is a small open economy,
many features concerning international financial markets
are simplified. As such, unlike studies such as García-
Cicco and Kawamura (2015), our model does not allow
for the assessment of policy complementarities between
fiscal management strategies and other macroprudential
regulations. Given that the presence of GLCs is likely to
not only influence the product market but also the alloca-
tion of financial resources, these are worth exploring in
the future. Second, nominal rigidities in prices and wages
can also be introduced, as in Heer and Schubert (2012),
therefore allowing greater roles for monetary policy
(vastly simplified in this model that focuses on fiscal pol-
icy) in influencing the business cycle of a resource-rich
economy. Third, according to emerging-market real
business-cycle studies (Aguiar & Gopinath, 2007; García-
Cicco et al., 2010), macroeconomic volatility experienced
in developing economies is due as much to stochastic
trend shocks as random unanticipated shocks. Given that
the objective of establishing a SWF in seeding and man-
aging GLCs domestically are often driven by long-run
strategic considerations, the role of trend shocks may be
worth examining.
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ENDNOTES
1 Note that the literature discussed, including this article, has a
slightly different emphasis compared to the largely empirical-
based literature of natural resource curse, which concerns the
lower long-term growth rate of resource-rich economies relative to
comparable but less resource-rich economies. See Frankel (2010)
and Badeeb, Lean, and Clark (2017) for a review of this related
but peripheral literature.
2 In fact, collectively, SOEs/GLCs accounted for 204 of the top 2,000
listed companies in the Forbes ranking in 2011 (Kowalski, Büge,
Sztajerowska, & Egeland, 2013), equity value of almost USD2 tril-
lion and more than 6 million employees (Christiansen, 2011).
Many GLCs in developing economies are also among the larg-
est corporations on FORTUNE Global 500, with most having
both direct and indirect links with the natural resources own-
ership of the country (Bremmer, 2010; Victor, Hults, &
Thurber, 2014).
3 It is customary to introduce a nontradable sector to generate sec-
torial reallocation effects following a commodity price shock
(due to real exchange rate reflecting the movement of non-
tradable prices). The asymmetric learning-by-doing externality
between the tradable and nontradable sectors is the mechanism
that generates the so-called Dutch Disease effects in most models.
We argue that this is not necessary and comes with a trade-off in
analysis involving developing economies: Data-based calibration
necessarily requires the authors to make assumptions on what
constitutes nontradable sectors, as in the case of García-Cicco
and Kawamura (2015). As such, most existing contributions,
including Agénor (2016), have adopted a parameterization strat-
egy, instead of actual data-based Bayesian calibration.
4 One could argue that the Malaysian economy is diversified
enough that it is not resource-dependent. However, within the
sample period of our estimation (1991–2016), oil revenue (not
including indirect levies) as a percentage of total government rev-
enue averages at 24.6%, reaching as high as 35.5% during the
2006–2014 period when the Putrajaya Committee-driven GLC
Transformation Programme is at its most active. These certainly
imply an economy whose business cycle is influenced by the oil
price cycle, irrespective of the heterogeneity in the structure of
the financing/investing activities of its different GLICs.
5 As pointed out in studies such as Menon (2014), in the GLC-
dominant economies of Malaysia, GLCs have footprints that
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cover almost all the sectors in the domestic economy, ranging
from banking, telecommunication, pharmaceuticals, wholesale
and retail. As such, the assumption that GLCs and POEs' goods
are gross substitutes (ω > 1) is reasonable.
6 The government-linked investment funds in Malaysia, collec-
tively GLICs, consist of a heterogeneous group of investment
funds. While the capitalization structure and investment strategy
is vastly different (and in some cases, such as the EPF and
KWAP, it is arguable that they should not be labelled as govern-
ment entities), the Malaysian government has a direct oversight
in most of their operations through the Putrajaya Committee on
GLC High Performance, as can be seen in Government of Malay-
sia (2006, 2012). As such, we believe our representative SWF is
able to reflect stylistically this feature.
7 As would be seen in the variance decomposition results in
Table 3 later, the variation in the foreign asset value held by the
Resource Fund, Ft, is solely driven by the two resource shocks. It
is therefore not included in the non-resource primary balance
specification.
8 A one-sided HP filter, rather than first-difference, is used to det-
rend data. We detrend all observed variables because they exhibit
trend movement over the sample to remove low-frequency varia-
tions. This treatment follows Christensen and Dib (2008), and
suits the data of developing countries like Malaysia, which
exhibit stochastic trend, hence making first-difference less appro-
priate in separating trend and cycle. Plus, the one-sided HP filter
is a ‘causal’ filter, in that, the detrending process is not affected
by the correlation between current and subsequent observations
(Guerrieri & Iacoviello, 2017).
9 The parameter values reflect an efficient capital accumulation
process, which is consistent with the business model of modern
corporatized strategic sovereign investment funds, as described
in Halland et al. (2016).
10 Their value is based on a limited number of studies, including
dated ones such as Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart (1996). This, cou-
ple with our Bayesian-estimated posterior mean (over a longer
sample period) falling well-within the range of their full-sample
mean and the more rigorous microdata-based estimates of stud-
ies such as Crossley and Low (2011), leads us to deduce that the
Malaysian households are likely to have a higher willingness to
substitute consumption intertemporally over a longer time
period.
11 Note that, unlike POE's profits, neither the dynamic system char-
acterizing the model's general equilibrium in Appendix A nor
the static simultaneous equation system characterizing the steady
state in Appendix B contains the πGLCt expression. This means it
is not a pre-condition for GLC to make positive profits for the
model to solve.
12 The simplified specification of resource revenue in this model
means the results from a temporary resource production shock
would provide essentially the same dynamics of variables to
those from a temporary resource price shock, albeit at a larger
magnitude. As such, we only present the impulse responses for
the resource price shock.
13 The merits of this stability criterion relative to the standard
utility-based social welfare measure are elaborated in greater
details by Agénor (2016) and therefore are not repeated here.
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